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THE PARIAH PRINCIPLE 
Daniel Farber* and Suzanna Sherry** 
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Romer v. Evansl has 
caused both joy and consternation. Among legal scholars, how-
ever, it has mostly engendered puzzlement. The Court explicitly 
avoided the most doctrinally plausible grounds for invalidating 
Colorado's ban on anti-discrimination protections for homosexu-
als. Instead it purported to strike down the state constitutional 
amendment under minimal scrutiny or rational basis review. The 
word on the street-or, in the case of lawyers and law professors, 
the word on the internet-is that Romer cannot mean what it 
says, but instead must be a way-station to declaring homosexual-
ity a quasi-suspect classification like gender or illegitimacy. The 
speculation is that the Court will eventually use Romer to strike 
down prohibitions on same-sex marriages and other restrictions 
on gay rights. 
We believe this line of reasoning gives the Romer majority 
too little credit for intellectual honesty, if perhaps too much 
credit for progressive impulses.z In this essay, we suggest that 
the decision in Romer means no more and no less than what it 
says (or at least tries to say): that Colorado's Amendment 2 is 
invalid regardless of the level of judicial scrutiny. Moreover, we 
contend that this conclusion does not significantly expand cur-
rent law but is instead perfectly justifiable under existing prece-
dent. The decision also does not necessarily threaten most other 
restrictions on homosexuals, including bans on same-sex 
marriage. 
We will begin by exploring the seemingly perplexing failure 
of the Romer Court to invoke some familiar doctrinal support. 
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1. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). 
2. Given the overall tenor of the current Court, it hardly seems plausible that the 
Justices are about to launch a new crusade for social justice on behalf of the 
downtrodden. 
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We will then attempt to articulate the principle we believe under-
lies Romer but is imperfectly explained in the opinion. This prin-
ciple, in a nutshell, forbids the government from designating any 
societal group as untouchable, regardless of whether the group in 
question is generally entitled to some special degree of judicial 
protection, like blacks, or to no special protection, like left-
banders (or, under current doctrine, homosexuals). We believe 
this principle is firmly rooted in existing constitutional law. Fi-
nally, we consider the difficulties of applying this principle to 
Amendment 2 and other legislation. We hope at least to per-
suade the reader that, contrary to the views of the dissenters and 
of many commentators, Justice Kennedy's opinion in Romer 
makes an intellectually respectable argument. 
I. THE ROADS NOT TAKEN 
In 1992, Colorado voters ratified an amendment to the state 
constitution that effectively prohibited the state or any of its sub-
divisions from enacting laws that protect homosexuals from dis-
crimination.3 The Colorado Supreme Court ultimately enjoined 
the state from enforcing the provision (Amendment 2), and the 
United States Supreme Court affirmed in Romer. At first blush, 
there seem to be three plausible arguments for invalidating 
Amendment 2. First, it might deprive homosexuals of a funda-
mental right, thus triggering (and failing) strict scrutiny under the 
equal protection clause. This, in fact, was the basis for the Colo-
rado court's decision. Second, it might be directed at a discrete 
and insular minority, again triggering some form of heightened 
scrutiny under the equal protection clause. Although plaintiffs 
made this argument, and many commentators support it,4 none 
3. Amendment 2 provided: 
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation. 
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor 
any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall 
enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby ho-
mosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships 
shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of 
persons to have or claim any minority status quota preferences, protected status 
or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all re-
spects self-executing. 
The Colorado Supreme Court interpreted the Amendment to invalidate all existing 
laws-including municipal ordinances, executive orders, and the like-prohibiting dis-
crimination against gays and lesbians and to preclude any future such laws. E11ans 11. 
Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1284-85 (1993). 
4. See, e.g., Bobbi Berstein, Power, Prejudice, and the Right to Speak: Litigating 
"Outness" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 269 (1995); John Charles 
Hayes, The Tradition of Prejudice Versus the Principle of Equality: Homosexuals and 
Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny After Bowers v. Hardwick, 31 B.C. L. Rev. 375 
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of the various courts in the Romer litigation accepted it. Finally, 
the Supreme Court might have relied on cases that apply a some-
what stricter form of minimal scrutiny, sometimes called "ra-
tional basis with teeth." In fact, the Court did none of these 
things. 
The Colorado Supreme Court held that Amendment 2 de-
prived homosexuals of "the right to participate equally in the 
political process."s Applying strict scrutiny to the deprivation of 
this fundamental right, the court concluded that it was unsup-
ported by a sufficiently compelling governmental interest.6 In 
holding that "the right to participate equally in the political pro-
cess" is a fundamental right, the Colorado court relied partly on 
voting rights cases, but primarily on cases which it said "bore a 
much closer resemblance to the question presented by Amend-
ment 2."7 According to the Colorado court, these cases, including 
Reitman v. Mulkey,s Hunter v. Erickson,9 and Washington v. Seat-
tle School District No. J,w stand for the broad proposition that a 
'"[s]tate may no more disadvantage any particular group by mak-
ing it more difficult to enact legislation [on] its behalf than it may 
dilute any person's vote or give any group smaller representation 
than another of comparable size. "'11 The United States Supreme 
Court explicitly disavowed this rationale, noting that it was af-
firming "on a rationale different from that adopted by the state 
supreme court. "12 
The Colorado court itself rejected another potential basis for 
applying heightened scrutiny to Amendment 2. Plaintiffs had 
contended that homosexuals should be considered a suspect or 
quasi-suspect class, thus subjecting Amendment 2 to strict or in-
termediate scrutiny. The trial court rejected this argument, and 
the Colorado Supreme Court explicitly refused to consider it.J3 
(1990); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex 
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 197 (1994); Eric A. Roberts, Heightened Scrutiny 
Under the Equal Protection Clause: A Remedy to Discrimination Based on Sexual Orienta-
tion, 42 Drake L. Rev. 485 (1993). 
5. 854 P.2d at 1285. 
6. The court first reached these conclusions in upholding the trial court's grant of a 
preliminary injunction against enforcement of Amendment 2. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 
1270 (Colo. 1993) (Evans !). It later reaffirmed the same conclusions in affirming the 
issuance of a permanent injunction. Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994) (Evans 
II). 
7. 854 P.2d at 1279. 
8. 387 u.s. 369 (1967). 
9. 393 u.s. 385 (1969). 
10. 458 u.s. 457 (1982). 
II. 854 P.2d at 1283, quoting Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385,389 (1969). 
12. 116 S. Ct. at 1624. 
13. 882 P.2d 1335, 1341 n.3 (Colo. 1994). 
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The United States Supreme Court also ignored this argument, 
reviewing the Amendment under the standard applying to legis-
lation that "neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a 
suspect class. "14 
Finally, the Supreme Court might have relied on the ap-
proach taken in a pair of cases from the 1980s. In each case, the 
Court had purported to apply minimal scrutiny to a statute that 
neither burdened a fundamental right nor targeted a suspect 
class, but it nevertheless invalidated the challenged law after a 
close examination of its purposes and effects. In Plyler v. Doe,1s 
Texas had attempted to prohibit illegal alien children from at-
tending public schools. The Supreme Court, after holding that 
illegal alien children do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect 
class and that education is not a fundamental right, rejected 
every justification for the law offered by the state. In City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,16 the city of Cleburne (also 
in Texas) had zoned a group home for the mentally-disabled out 
of a residential neighborhood. Again, after explicitly concluding 
that the rational basis test provided the appropriate level of scru-
tiny, the Court struck down the zoning restriction. Given the 
Court's rather cavalier rejection of the plausible governmental 
interests behind these two laws, it is difficult to reconcile the two 
cases with ordinary applications of the rational basis test. In-
deed, commentators have generally viewed these two cases as ev-
idence of a fourth tier of scrutiny under the equal protection 
clause, sometimes labeled "rational basis with teeth. "17 
Although these cases might thus have provided support for inval-
idating Amendment 2 using minimal scrutiny, the Romer opinion 
did not cite either one. Instead, the Court relied on hoary cases 
embodying weak formulations of the rational basis test, including 
FS. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,IB Williamson v. Lee Optical 
of Oklahoma, Inc.,19 and Railway Express Agency v. New York.20 
The Court apparently believed that Amendment 2 failed to sat-
isfy even the most minimal scrutiny. 
14. 116 S. Ct. at 1627. 
15. 457 u.s. 202 (1982). 
16. 473 u.s. 432 (1985). 
17. David 0. Stewart. Supreme Court Report: A Growing Equal Proceccion Clause?, 
71 A.B.A. J. 108,112 (Oct. 1985) (quoting Victor Rosenblum); see also Gayle Lynn Pet-
tinga, Racional Basis Wich Bice: Incermediace Scruciny by Any Ocher Name, 62 Ind. L.J. 779 
(1987). Although the Court did not cite these cases, it did cite a later case limiting them, 
Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993). 
18. 253 u.s. 412 (1920). 
19. 348 u.s. 483 (1955). 
20. 336 U.S. 106 (1949). 
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The Court also declined the invitation to apply a literal read-
ing of the equal protection clause to Amendment 2. At oral ar-
gument, the suggestion had been made that Amendment 2 
deprived homosexuals of any right to legal protection, even 
under laws of general application such as the assault statutes.21 
Given the lack of any textual basis in Amendment 2 for this in-
terpretation, the Court wisely eschewed this analysis. Nor did 
the Court follow the suggestion, made in an amicus brief filed by 
some leading constitutional scholars, that Amendment 2 
amounted to a form of outlawry. Their premise was that the 
equal protection clause "requires a regime that gives all persons 
equal access at least to the possibility of protection under the 
laws of the state from the wrongs that may befall them-whether 
such wrongs as robbery or such wrongs as discrimination, and 
whether privately or officially inflicted. "22 Apart from one pass-
ing remark,23 however, the Court did not explicitly endorse this 
line of analysis any more than it did a heightened level of 
scrutiny. 
21. See 116 S. Ct. at 1630. 
22. Brief of Laurence H. Tribe, John Hart Ely, Gerald Gunther, Philip B. Kurland, 
and Kathleen M. Sullivan, as amici curiae in support of respondents. The principle that 
the government may not create a class of outlaws seems sound. See Gerald L. Neuman, 
Aliens as Outlaws: GovernmenT Services, Proposition /87, and the Structure of Equal Pro-
tection Doctrine, 42 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1425, 1440-42 (1995). Surely, however, the status of 
outlawry depends on the degree to which the laws actually protect a person's rights, not 
on the degree to which he might be able to obtain future legislation protecting them. For 
example, ordinary legislation that deprived a group of any protection from the criminal 
law would surely create a state of outlawry, even though the group retained the right to 
seek a repeal of the law. But the right to protection by anti-discrimination laws is clearly 
not in the same class as the right to protection from criminal conduct-otherwise, every 
group in America would have an inherent right to be made a "protected class" 
immediately. 
23. The Court does remark at one point that "[a] law declaring that in general it 
shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the 
government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense." 116 
S. Ct. at 1628 (emphasis added). This statement is probably correct if the kind of general 
declaration to which the Court refers includes the ordinary protection of criminal and tort 
law. For instance, a rule prohibiting 911 calls by homosexuals would surely violate equal 
protection in some primal sense. On the other hand, it must clearly be true that the state 
can selectively bar groups from some kinds of aid; the Court surely did not mean to 
invalidate a state constitutional provision barring farm assistance, even though such a 
provision makes it more difficult for farmers to obtain a form of government "aid." 
Amendment 2 fell short of the kind of general declaration to which the Court seems to be 
referring. It did not declare that "in general" it would be more difficult for homosexuals 
to receive aid from the government than members of other groups; it only restricted a 
specific type of aid. 
Although the Court did not explicitly endorse the amicus briefs analysis, the brief 
may well have contributed to the opinion by nudging the Court toward reconceptualizing 
the case. Although the brief takes the idea in a different direction than the Court or our 
own analysis does, it does put forward the view that Romer involved a kind of outcast 
status. 
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Hence the puzzlement of legal commentators. As we all 
teach our students,24 the Court never invalidates statutes unless it 
applies something more than "real" minimal scrutiny; it has not 
done so, our lectures recite, since 1937. Indeed, both of the au-
thors play the following game with students as part of the unit on 
the rational basis test: "You think of a ridiculous statute and I 
will give a sufficiently rational justification to withstand minimal 
scrutiny." We have justified requiring cars to be painted blue (to 
give a boost to the blue paint industry, or to make it easier to 
identify emergency vehicles), allocating benefits based on astro-
logical signs (perhaps there is something to the personality differ-
ences astrologers attribute to date of birth, or else division by 
astrological sign is a convenient alternative to a lottery), and re-
quiring all contracts to be written in Sanskrit (to foster education 
and increase employment opportunities for linguists). We have 
been stumped only once, when a student proposed the "Jim 
Jones law": everyone in the United States has to drink deadly 
poison at a particular tirne.2s So how could the Supreme Court 
have invalidated a provision that three Justices considered emi-
nently reasonable? 
The Court's puzzling reliance on the rational basis test, while 
eschewing seemingly more promising lines of argument, left it 
vulnerable to a blistering dissent by Justice Scalia. Justice Scalia 
argued that the rational basis test was easily met. If a state can 
make homosexual conduct a crime, "surely it is constitutionally 
permissible for a State to enact other laws merely disfavoring ho-
mosexual conduct. "26 Furthermore, 
[A ]ssuming that, in Amendment 2, a person of homosexual 
"orientation" is someone who does not engage in homosexual 
conduct but merely has a tendency or desire to do so, Bowers 
still suffices to establish a rational basis for the provision. If it 
is rational to criminalize the conduct, surely it is rational to 
deny special favor and protection to those with a self-avowed 
tendency or desire to engage in the conduct. Indeed, where 
24. This is a variant on '"what every schoolchild knows," a somewhat suspect formu-
lation. See PhilipP. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional 
Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 695. 6% & n.10 
( 1996). Nevertheless, the statement in the text appears to be uncontroverted. 
25. One of us argued that the statute is rationally related to environmental protec-
tion because the elimination of the human population would reduce pollution and con-
serve natural resources. Students-and the other author-were not persuaded, however, 
though this argument does seem sufficient to satisfy rational basis as it is usually articu-
lated. (Note that this example really involves the use of the rational basis test under 
substantive due process rather than equal protection: the hypothetical statute cannot be 
faulted for failing to treat all groups equally.) 
26. 116 S. Ct. at 1631 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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criminal sanctions are not involved, homosexual "orientation" 
is an acceptable stand-in for homosexual conduct.27 
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Thus, Justice Scalia concluded, "[n]o principle set forth in the 
Constitution, nor even any imagined by this Court in the past 200 
years, prohibits what Colorado has done here. "2s Accusing the 
majority of "heavy reliance upon principles of righteousness 
rather than judicial holdings," Justice Scalia characterized the de-
cision as an imposition of elite cultural values on the populace.29 
If, as Justice Scalia so forcibly argues, the Romer opinion is 
indefensible on its own terms, is there any explanation for the 
opinion other than sheer lawlessness? One response, which has 
already circulated among Court-watchers, is that Romer is a tem-
porary ruling, which will eventually be replaced by a decision 
recognizing sexual orientation as a quasi-suspect classification 
subject to intermediate scrutiny. Adherents to this view have 
some historical evidence on their side: both of the classifications 
currently accorded intermediate scrutiny-gender and illegiti-
macy-were initially subject to exactly the sort of "heightened 
minimal scrutiny" that the Court is said to have used in Romer. 
In Reed v. Reed,Jo the Court purported to use minimal scrutiny to 
invalidate a law preferring men over women in the choice of es-
tate administrators. Under traditional minimal scrutiny, the ad-
ministrative convenience of a rule preferring the gender more 
likely to have had business experienceJJ should have been suffi-
cient to justify the law. Five years later, the Court abandoned the 
pretense of minimal scrutiny and declared gender discrimination 
subject to intermediate scrutiny.32 The same pattern unfolded in 
the illegitimacy cases, although over a longer period of time: af-
ter invalidating several laws discriminating against illegitimate 
children or their parents under the rubric of minimal scrutiny, 
the Court eventually determined that intermediate scrutiny 
should apply.33 
27. !d. at 1632 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
28. Id. at 1633 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
29. !d. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
30. 404 U.S. 71 ( 1971 ). 
31. This assumption obviously was more valid in 1971, when the case was decided, 
than it is today. 
32. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). In the interim, four members of the Court 
indicated their willingness to apply strict scrutiny to gender distinctions. Frontiero v. Rich-
ardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
33. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1%8) (statute invalidated under mini-
mal scrutiny); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (statute upheld under minimal scru-
tiny); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (statute invalidated under minimal 
scrutiny); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (statute upheld under minimal scrutiny); 
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (intermediate scrutiny applied). 
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But using "rational basis with teeth" to predict the eventual 
application of intermediate scrutiny does not always work. As 
Plyler and Cleburne both show, the Court does not always take 
the second step. It would be easier, of course, to fit Romer into 
the latter pattern if the Court had cited Plyler or Cleburne. As it 
is, viewing Romer as an example of "heightened minimal scru-
tiny" leaves open the question of which category it fits into. Is 
Romer a way-station on the route to intermediate scrutiny or 
does it instead establish yet another instance of "semi-quasi-sus-
pect classification"? 
This question arises only because of the premise that some 
form of heightened scrutiny is necessary to justify the result. This 
premise seems to be common ground between Justice Scalia's 
dissent and Romer's supporters. Scalia assumed that because of 
Hardwick v. Bowers, homosexuals as a class are entitled to no 
special degree of constitutional protection, and thus that Romer 
cannot be justified. Romer's supporters are likely to argue that 
Romer amounts to a covert recognition that something more 
than minimal judicial scrutiny is required in gay rights cases. We 
would like to explore a third possibility: that the majority was 
correct to invalidate the law without using heightened scrutiny. 
We suggest that the result in Romer can be defended without 
resolving any general questions about the degree of scrutiny for 
laws affecting homosexuals. In other words, we contend that the 
Court correctly concluded that every group-whether homosex-
uals, smokers, left-banders, or the overweight-is entitled to pro-
tection from certain kinds of legislation. 
Our proposition requires rejection of Justice Scalia's appar-
ent assumption that, if the state has the right to criminalize cer-
tain conduct, it necessarily has the unlimited right to promote 
private discrimination against any group with a propensity to en-
gage in that conduct. Rather, we believe, a distinction must be 
drawn between the state's power to regulate conduct and its abil-
ity to designate groups as untouchable. Indeed, we believe that 
this principle, once properly articulated, is firmly rooted in ex-
isting law-if not almost too obvious to be debatable. What is 
less obvious is how to apply the principle, and it is for this reason 
that Romer at first blush seems to require the assistance of some 
extra level of judicial scrutiny. Properly understood, however, 
Amendment 2 was not, as Justice Scalia would put it, an unex-
ceptional effort to block a group from obtaining special privi-
leges, but rather an effort to single out a group for pariah status. 
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II. PARIAHS AND THE CONSTITUTION 
A. DEFINING THE pARIAH PRINCIPLE 
I. 
A 23-year-old woman had just given birth to her first 
baby when she learned something devastating about her hus-
band. He was secretly a burakumin, a descendant of outcasts. 
So the woman refused to touch her own babv. She returned to 
her parents' house and abandoned her husband and child 
forever.J4 
ii. 
Tyranny of [the] caste system, experienced by him in his 
early life is as follows: when he was only 5 years old, he learnt 
that no barber would cut his hair for fear of pollution and so 
this chore had to be done by his sister. Stranded with his sister 
on the railway platform at Gurgaon, he found that no bullock 
cart driver would take them. And when he found one cart, the 
driver would not drive the cart, a job he had to do ... himself . 
. . . Returning from England. with a Doctorate degree to serve 
the Baroda state according to the terms of scholarship he 
availed, Ambedkar found that no one was willing to rent a 
house to him.35 
No member of a Hindu caste may accept cooked food. 
salt, milk or water from an untouchable. His touch is polluting. 
even his nearness is often sufficient to defile a man of high 
caste. In some cases even his sight is polluting. He is debarred 
from using all public conveniences, roads. vehicles. ferries, 
wells, schools, restaurants and tea shops.36 
iii. 
Cornelia Otis Skinner, the noted actress. found it virtually 
impossible to obtain hotel reservations for herself and her 
Negro maid during a 1948 tour of the segregated territory. 
One Southern theatrical agent suggested that accommodation 
might be more readily available if the maid would wear a 
nurse's uniform. Only four hotels in the South would finally 
take in both, and even these insisted that the two sleep in sep-
arate rooms, and that the maid use only the service eleva-
tor. ... Taxis would accept both, but if Miss Skinner went to 
her hotel first, the maid would be dumped on the sidewalk and 
265 
34. Nicholas D. Kristof. Japan's Im·isible Minoriry: Beuer Off Than in Pas£, bw Srill 
Owcasrs, N.Y. Times at A18 (Nov. 30, 1995). 
35. W.C. Deb, Crime Against Humanity 67 (Uppal Publishing House, 1993). 
36. Stephen Fuchs, At rhe Bottom of Indian Society: The Harijan and 01her Low 
Castes 4 (Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, Pvt. Ltd., 1981 ). 
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told to call a Negro cab for the remainder of the ride to a 
Negro hotel.J7 
Summer, 1965. Father, mother, brother, me. En route to 
New York City, by way of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, Washing-
ton. D.C., and Annapolis. Maryland. First stop Annapolis, 
late, tired from hours of driving, and hungry. Hotel, after ho-
tel, after hoteL we find. Simply no room for a family like 
mine .... 
I could talk about how it felt to see my father go in and 
out of those red and brown brick buildings, in the rain, won-
dering how they said what they said to him, but I've promised 
myself not to get angry this trip.38 
The state's table was placed at right angles to that of the 
defense so that opposing counsel were almost face to face. The 
weather was extremely warm that day and, although pitchers 
of ice water and cups were placed on the judge's bench and on 
the state's table, none was provided for the defense. Defense 
counsel were told, however, that they might use a "for colored 
only" fountain located outside the courtroom.39 
Not only are Negro corpses commonly barred from burial 
in white cemeteries; in the nation's capital a cemetery for pets 
refuses to inter the remains of pets that were owned by 
Negroes.40 
What these passages have in common is that they describe 
the daily indignities of social pariahs. Whether they are called 
outcasts or untouchables or worse, pariahs are not simply the 
group at the bottom of the social or economic ladder. To be a 
pariah is to be shunned and isolated, to be treated as if one had a 
loathsome and contagious disease. The message is that outcasts 
are not merely inferior; they are not fully human, and contact 
with them is dangerous and degrading. 
That such a system once existed in this country will forever 
be a source of shame; that it is now an anathema cannot be 
doubted. If the equal protection clause means anything, it means 
that the government cannot pass caste legislation: it cannot ere-
37. Stetson Kennedy, Jim Crow Guide: The Way It Was 194 (Florida Atlantic U. 
Press, 1990). 
38. Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Word and the River: Pedagogy as Scholarship as 
Struggle, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2231, 2279-80 (1992). See also Karen Fields, Introduction to 
Mamie Garvin Fields, Lemon Swamp and Other Places: A Carolina Memoir xiii (The Free 
Press, 1983). 
39. Henry v. Williams, 299 F. Supp. 36, 41 (N.D. Miss. 1969) 
40. Kennedy, Jim Crow Guide at 85 (cited in note 37). See also C. Vann Woodward, 
The Strange Career of Jim Crow (Oxford U. Press, 1974); Neil R. McMillen, Dark Jour-
ney: Black Mississippians in the Age of Jim Crow (U. of Illinois Press, 1989). 
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ate or sanction outcast groups. The Court has recognized that 
when the government treats a group of citizens as pariahs, it im-
poses two unacceptable harms. It simultaneously brands them as 
inferior and encourages others to ostracize them. Thus, in 
Strauder v. West Virginia,41 the Court invalidated a law that pro-
hibited blacks from sitting on juries on the ground that it was 
"practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion 
of their inferiority, and a stimulant to ... race prejudice. "42 Our 
Constitution does not permit the government to declare "an 
open season" on some group of citizens.43 
Indeed, as Justice Harlan wrote in his justly lauded dissent in 
Plessy v. Ferguson, "[t]here is no caste here."44 "We boast of the 
freedom enjoyed by our people above all other peoples," he con-
tinued, "[b ]ut it is difficult to reconcile that boast with a state of 
the law which, practically, puts the brand of servitude and degra-
dation upon a large class of our fellow-citizens, our equals before 
the law."4s Various Justices have reiterated his sentiment. Ply-
ler, in which the Court struck down a mean-spirited attempt to 
deprive illegal alien children of a public education, is only the 
most recent example. In that case, the Court noted that "[t]he 
Equal Protection Clause was intended to work nothing less than 
the abolition of all caste-based ... legislation. "4o Caste legisla-
tion, wrote Justice Douglas in 1941, is "utterly incompatible with 
the spirit of our system of government."47 The Court has noted 
that the Constitution does not permit states to "divide citizens 
into ... permanent classes."4s The Court has frequently quoted 
Senator Howard, who defended the proposed Fourteenth 
Amendment on the floor of the Senate by suggesting that its rna-
41. 100 u.s. 303 (1879). 
42. !d. at 308. 
43. See Glona v. American Guarantee & Liabili£y Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968) 
(invalidating a law that "creates an open season on illegitimates in the area of automobile 
accidents"). In extreme cases. an "open season" law would be equivalent to outlawry. 
See supra note 22. 
44. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, 1., dissenting). 
45. !d. at 562. 
46. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 213 (1982); see also id. at 217 n.14 (Texas statute 
invalidated by the Court ·'suggests the kind of ·class or caste' treatment that the Four-
teenth Amendment was designed to abolish"). For other examples of condemnation of 
caste, see, e.g. Ci£y of Cleburne 1'. Cleburne Living Cemer, 473 U.S. 432, 471-72 (1985) 
(opinion of Marshall, 1.); Garner 1·. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 185 (1961) (Douglas, 1., con-
curring); Boddie v. ConneC£icU£, 401 U.S. 371, 385 (1971) (Douglas, 1., concurring); 
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238. 255. 257 (1972) (Douglas, 1., concurring); Kadrmas v. 
Dickinson Public Schools, 487 U.S. 450, 469 (1988) (Marshall, 1., dissenting). 
47. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 181 (1941) (Douglas, 1., concurring). 
48. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 64 (1982); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202. 
234 (1982) (Blackmun, 1., concurring). 
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jor purpose was to "abolis[h] all class legislation .. and [do] 
away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of persons to a 
code not applicable to another."49 
The Court has also endorsed the related notion that the gov-
ernment cannot impose disabilities on an individual who bears 
no responsibility for his status. In invalidating laws discriminating 
against illegitimate children, for example, the Court noted that 
"imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the 
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some 
relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing."so In Ply-
ler, too, the Court stressed the injustice of imposing "a lifetime 
hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for their 
disabling status. ''sJ This principle goes beyond the criminal jus-
tice principle demanding individualized determinations of actual 
wrongdoing before punishment is imposed. It is instead another 
formulation of the anti-caste aspect of the equal protection 
clause: the government cannot single out a whole group of peo-
ple to brand them with inferior status. 
The pariah principle is at its strongest when the individuals 
so targeted are not responsible for their status, but it has force 
even where the individual bears some responsibility. In the im-
mediate aftermath of the Civil War, the Court invoked the bill of 
attainder clause to strike down occupational disabilities imposed 
on former Confederates. Cummings v. Missourisz held unconsti-
tutional a provision of the Missouri Constitution that required an 
oath regarding past loyalty as a precondition for several occupa-
tions, including the priesthood. The Court said the loyalty oath 
sought "to reach the person, not the calling" and was intended as 
punishment rather than a bona fide occupational qualification.s3 
If it had been upheld, the Missouri constitutional provision 
would have created a large caste of individuals barred from key 
occupations because of their unworthiness. In Ex Parte Gar-
land,s4 the Court applied the same rationale to invalidate a ban 
on former Confederates practicing law in federal court. More 
49. Cong. Globe, 39th Cong. 1st Sess. 2766 (1866). The Court has quoted Howard in 
numerous cases. including Plyler L Doe. 457 U.S. 202,214-15 (1982);Jones v. Helms, 452 
U.S. 412,424 n.23 (1981); Reynolds~·. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,600 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing). See also Adamson v. California. 332 U.S. 46,52 n.8 (1947) (quoting Senator Sumner 
to effect that the Fourteenth Amendment abolished "oligarchy, aristocracy, caste, or mo-
nopoly with peculiar privileges and powers"). 
50. Weber ~·. Aerna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972). 
51. 457 U.S. at 223. 
52. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866). 
53. ld. at 320. 
54. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866). 
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recently, the Court reaffirmed this broad approach to the bill of 
attainder clause in United States v. Brown,ss in which the Court 
struck a ban on the holding of union office by current or former 
members of the Communist Party. In each of these cases, the 
Court was unpersuaded that the occupational disability was a ra-
tional attempt to prevent future harm as opposed to a sanction 
for past misconduct. 
The trait in question in each of these cases was immutable, 
in the sense that the relevant conduct was in the past and un-
changeable.so On the other hand, the disability was imposed on 
the basis of some actual past conduct, rather a presumed "orien-
tation" toward misconduct. The broader principle would seem to 
be that the function of legislation is to regulate future conduct 
rather than to express moral judgments about past conduct or 
character flaws. Indeed, the Court has gone so far as to hold that 
any criminal punishment whatsoever for even such a serious de-
fect as drug addiction would violate the cruel and unusual pun-
ishment clauseY Yet drug addiction is certainly something that 
the state has every right to discourage. Likewise, as Justice 
Scalia seems to have conceded, the state could not possibly 
criminalize homosexual orientation (as opposed to homosexual 
conduct). The bill of attainder cases suggest that the state simi-
larly could not use occupational limitations as a means of expres-
sing its disapproval of homosexual orientation or even of past 
homosexual conduct. 
Thus, the Court has recognized a broad principle in a wide 
range of cases, including equal protection cases, bill of attainder 
cases, and even cruel and unusual punishment cases. The princi-
ple is that the government cannot brand any group as unworthy 
to participate in civil society. Even the most serious past mis-
conduct-the Confederates were, after all, guilty of treason-
does not provide a basis for this kind of group sanction. Still less 
can a group be deprived of civil equality based on immutable 
characteristics such as sexual orientation. This principle is at the 
heart of the Romer Court's declaration that Amendment 2 "has 
the peculiar property of imposing a broad and undifferentiated 
55. 381 U.S. 437 ( 1965). The application of the bill of attainder clause to Romer is 
brilliantly argued in Akhil Reed Amar, Auainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness 
(forthcoming, Mich. L. Rev.). 
56. For this reason. the bill of attainder clause normally does not apply when indi-
viduals have the ability to exit the targeted class. See Selective Service System v. MPIRG, 
468 u.s. 841 (1984). 
57. Robinson ~·. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
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disability on a single named group, an exceptional and ... invalid 
form of legislation."ss 
The Court has rarely invoked the pariah principle,s9 perhaps 
because such legislation is rare. But there are some indications 
that the majority in Romer v. Evans relied on the pariah principle 
to invalidate Colorado's Amendment 2. Justice Kennedy's opin-
ion for the Court concluded that a state "cannot ... deem a class 
of persons a stranger to its laws,"6o nor "make them unequal to 
everyone else."6J He also suggested that it is "not within our 
constitutional tradition" to enact laws "declaring that in general 
it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all 
others to seek aid from the government."6z Animus and hostility 
are not legitimate governmental motivations. Even Justice Scalia 
did not seem to dispute that the equal protection clause might 
embody the pariah principle; he simply denied that Amendment 
58. 116 S. Ct. at 1627. 
59. A computer search reveals that the word ·•caste" appears in 36 Supreme Court 
cases. Aside from the ones cited earlier in this essay, the bulk of the citations are concur-
ring or dissenting arguments that a particular piece of legislation-usually affirmative ac-
tion-does or does not create a forbidden caste system. Each argument contains an 
implicit recognition that legislation that does create a caste system is unconstitutional. See 
Richmond ~·. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 527 (1989) ("a 'quota is ... a creator of 
castes"') (Scalia, J., concurring); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2120 
(1995) ("There is no moral or constitutional equivalence between a policy that is designed 
to perpetuate a caste system and one that seeks to eradicate racial subordination.") (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting); id. at 2123 n.5 ("I would not find Justice Thomas' extreme proposi-
tion-that there is a moral and constitutional equivalence between an attempt to 
subjugate and an attempt to redress the effects of a caste system ... -at all persuasive.") 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2498 (1995) (quoting Stevens' 
dissent in Adarand) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2506 (same) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); 
United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 254 (1979) ("the racial quota is 
nonetheless a creator of castes") (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 
U.S. 312,343 (1974) ("[a] segregated admissions process creates suggestions of stigma and 
caste no less than a segregated classroom.") (Douglas. J., dissenting); U.S. v. Yaze/1, 382 
U.S. 341, 361 (1966) (system of 'coverture' is an "archaic remnant of a primitive caste 
system") (Black, J., dissenting); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226.287 (1964) ("denial of the 
constitutional right of Negroes to access to places of public accommodation would perpet-
uate a caste system in the United States") (Goldberg, J., concurring); Lathrop v. Dono-
hue, 367 U.S. 820,882 (1961) (requiring bar membership dues "has the mark of 'a lawyer 
class or caste"') (Douglas, J., dissenting); Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485,504 (1877) (discuss-
ing whether "separation tended to deepen and perpetuate the odious distinction of 
caste") (Clifford, J., concurring); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 91 (1872) 
(discussing whether commercial regulation "makes a caste of [one class of persons] to 
subserve the power, pride, avarice, vanity, or vengeance of others") (Field, J., dissenting). 
There are also a few cases which quote the certificate of incorporation of the NAACP, 
which states that one of the organization's principle objectives is to "eradicate caste." See 
NAACP v. Overstreet, 384 U.S. 118, 120 n.2 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting); NAACP v. 
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,451 n.* (1958); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,526 (1960). 
60. 116 S. Ct. at 1629. 
61. !d. 
62. !d. at 1628. 
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2 constituted the sort of caste legislation that would violate the 
principle. 
B. THE pARIAH PRINCIPLE AND OTHER APPROACHES TO 
EQUAL PROTECTION 
Not surprisingly, given its intuitive appeal, the pariah princi-
ple resonates with other constitutional theories pertaining to the 
exclusion of minority groups. It is distinguishable from those 
theories primarily by its sharper focus. 
One approach to the problem of group exclusion focuses on 
the stigma imposed on members of the "outgroup." The stigma 
approach is exemplified by Justice O'Connor's "endorsement" 
test in establishment clause cases.63 In Justice O'Connor's view, 
the government can neither "send a message to nonadherents [to 
a particular religion] that they are outsiders, not full members of 
the political community,"64 nor "mak[e] adherence to religion 
relevant to a person's standing in the political community. "tis 
Whether or not this is an appropriate test for the religion 
clauses,66 it is an apt description of caste legislation. Indeed, the 
message sent by caste legislation is even stronger: all right-think-
ing people should avoid any contact with those the legislation 
makes pariahs. Pariahs are outsiders not only to the political 
community, but to the human community. The hostility ex-
pressed by pariah legislation is visceral and deep-seated, reflect-
ing a view of the pariahs as contaminating-literally 
untouchable. 
The concept of stigma has also played a role in thinking 
about equal protection. Most notably, the Supreme Court relied 
on the stigmatizing effect of segregation as a reason for invalidat-
ing it in Brown v. Board of Education. Charles Lawrence has ex-
panded the idea of stigma as part of a full-blown theory of anti-
discrimination law. Lawrence argues that strict scrutiny should 
apply when legislation operates to "shame and degrade a class of 
persons by labeling it as inferior."67 Stigma causes two kinds of 
harm: it inflicts psychological injury on its victims and signals in-
63. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,689-90 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); 
Wallace v. laffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69-70 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
64. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
65. laffree, 472 U.S. at 69 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
66. For criticism of the endorsement test in the religion context, see, e.g., Michael 
W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 115, 147-57 (1992). 
67. Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317, 350 (1987). 
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ferior status to others.68 Consequently, Lawrence calls on courts 
to invalidate government actions that convey a "cultural mean-
ing" of racial inferiority, such as the building of a wall between a 
white and black community.69 Similarly, Kenneth Karst has ar-
ticulated a principle of equality that "centers on those aspects of 
equality that are most closely bound to the sense of self and the 
sense of inclusion in a community."7o 
These stigma-based theories have an obvious resemblance to 
the pariah principle. The pariah principle is narrower, however. 
Rather than addressing all government actions that may lead to 
damaging feelings of exclusion, it is limited to the extreme form 
of exclusion faced by untouchables. Moreover, although psycho-
logical impact may be a supporting rationale for the pariah prin-
ciple, the principle is primarily focused on the victims' right to 
participate in civil society rather than on their feelings of self-
esteem. 
In this respect, it is more closely allied with the views of the 
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. During the Reconstruc-
tion period, political and legal theorists distinguished between 
civil rights and social rights. The Fourteenth Amendment was in 
large part an effort to assure a firm constitutional basis for the 
1866 Civil Rights Act, which in turn was a response to the post-
Civil War black codes in the South. The black codes deprived 
blacks of a variety of rights regarding employment, property 
ownership, free movement, and participation in the legal system, 
and the Civil Rights Act was meant to guarantee the right of 
blacks to participate in civil society.7t Guarding the self-esteem 
of blacks was a much lower priority. Although the pariah princi-
ple does not ignore psychological trauma or the handicaps on so-
cial interaction created by untouchable status, it gives equal 
attention to the evil of what the Romer Court called "exclusion 
from an almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors 
that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society."n 
Another approach to equal protection focuses on the 
subordinate position of certain groups in society. This approach, 
and its connection with the concept of caste, has been most ambi-
68. ld. at 351. 
69. ld. at 355-56, 363-64. 
70. Kenneth L. Karst, Belonging to America: Equal Citizenship and the Constitution 
3 (Yale U. Press, 1989). 
71. The history is recounted in Daniel A. Farber and Suzanna Sherry, A History of 
the American Constitution 298-305 (West Publishing Co., 1990). See also Cass R. Sun-
stein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2410,2435-36 (1994) (black codes as para-
digm denials of equal protection). 
72. 116 S. Ct. at 1627. 
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tiously developed by Cass Sunstein. Sunstein articulates his anti-
caste principle as follows: 
[T]he anticaste principle forbids social and legal practices from 
translating highly visible and morally irrelevant differences 
into systemic social disadvantage, unless there is a very good 
reason for society to do so. On this view, a special problem of 
inequality arises when members of a group suffer from a range 
of disadvantages because of a group-based characteristic that 
is both visible for all to see and irrelevant from a moral point 
of view. This form of inequality is likely to be unusually per-
sistent and to extend into multiple social spheres, indeed into 
the interstices of everyday Iife.73 
In his terms, society's treatment of women and blacks violates 
the anticaste principle; discrimination against Jews, homosexuals, 
and the poor does not. 74 
Sun stein's principle is both broader and narrower than the 
pariah principle. It is broader in that the concept of caste is 
wider than that of untouchability. Indeed, the Indian caste sys-
tem predated the creation of untouchable castesJs Clearly, a 
group may occupy a subordinate position without being untouch-
able-women, whom Sunstein consider to be a subordinate 
caste, are the most obvious example. On the other hand, Sun-
stein's view is also narrower because he limits his definition of 
caste to visible characteristics-a definition that might paradoxi-
cally exclude the Indian untouchable caste. More importantly, 
Sunstein's approach is an effort to identify protected classes 
whose low economic and political status deserves special solici-
tude, whereas the pariah principle protects any group from being 
legislated into outcast status. 
Sunstein's approach is an ambitious reconceptualization of 
existing equal protection doctrine. Like his anticaste principle, 
the conventional concept of suspect classes is related to the pa-
riah principle but is nevertheless quite distinct. 
One factor the Court considers in determining whether leg-
islation is directed at a discrete and insular minority-a "suspect 
classification" in equal protection parlance-is whether the trait 
that identifies the target group is immutable.76 Thus race and 
73. Sunstein, 92 Mich. L. Rev. at 2411-12 (cited in note 71). 
74. Id. at 2438, 2444. 
75. See Tirnur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Pref-
erence Falsification 200-01 (Harvard U. Press, 1995). 
76. For an elaboration, see Suzanna Sherry, Selective Judicial Activism in the Equal 
Protection Context: Democracy, Distrust, and Deconstruction, 73 Georgetown L.J. 89, 113-
14 (1984). 
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gender qualify, but age and poverty do not. Pariah legislation is 
typically directed at status rather than conduct, and often that 
status is hereditary. While not identical to the question of immu-
tability, these characteristics also focus on the extent to which the 
targets of the legislation can control the trait that distinguishes 
them from the rest of the population. But just as it overlaps im-
perfectly with Sunstein's caste principle, the pariah principle is 
simultaneously broader and narrower than the idea of immuta-
bility. Status is not simply the possession of an immutable trait: it 
is the labeling of a person based on who he is rather than what he 
does. It carries with it echoes of pre-Enlightenment hierarchies 
based on birth and parentage. Status need not be either immuta-
ble or hereditary. A child with a hideous defect, born of normal 
parents, would once have been (and unfortunately might still be) 
accorded pariah status; if surgery corrects the defect, the child's 
status might change. 
Another crucial difference distinguishes standard three-
tiered equal protection doctrine from the pariah principle. Con-
ventional doctrine looks to the target group's general status in 
society. If the Court determines that that status is too vulnera-
ble-that is, that the group constitutes a discrete and insular mi-
nority-then all legislation intentionally disadvantaging the 
group is subject to heightened scrutiny. The pariah principle, by 
contrast, looks only to the particular legislation at issue to deter-
mine whether it creates or encourages pariah status. Thus under 
conventional analysis, all intentional discrimination against peo-
ple of color, however mild, is subject to strict scrutiny. Discrimi-
nation against left-handers, however, is acceptable under three-
tiered equal protection doctrine. It violates the Constitution only 
if it makes them pariahs-and even after such legislation is inval-
idated, other discriminatory statutes are left untouched. In other 
words, a determination that a particular statute violates the pa-
riah principle does not convert the target group into a discrete 
and insular minority.n 
The pariah principle does not fit neatly within any of these 
current ways of thinking about equal protection, but its family 
77. Of course, if enough such statutes exist, that might show the group's vulnerabil· 
ity to hostile legislation and thus provide some evidence for a conclusion that the group is 
a discrete and insular minority. Nevertheless, there is a significant difference between 
concluding that some people are, as a class, generally considered pariahs by society, and 
concluding that a particular statute treats them as pariahs. The pariah principle is thus 
broader than Carotene Products in that it is not limited to those generally disadvantaged 
by our society, but it is also narrower in that it has nothing to say about run-of-the-mill 
discriminatory legislation against even the most vulnerable groups. 
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resemblance to them is no coincidence. Modern thinking about 
equal protection centers around Brown, which means that Jim 
Crow is the paradigm violation of the equal protection clause. 
But there are many overlapping ways of conceptualizing the evils 
of Jim Crow. Carolene Products centers around the political sub-
ordination of blacks in the old South; the anticaste principle fo-
cuses on their social and economic subordination; and the stigma 
theory focuses on the racist ideology of inferiority. The pariah 
principle focuses on the resemblances between their situation 
and that of untouchable castes: the taboos based on their pre-
sumed inferiority that prohibited blacks from engaging freely in 
many of the ordinary transactions of everyday life. Except for 
Jim Crow, legislation giving credence to such taboos has been 
rare in American society, which is why other ways of generalizing 
from the rejection of Jim Crow have seemed more fruitful. 
Apart from Jim Crow, such legislative judgments of inferiority 
typically have been based on past conduct, which is why the bill 
of attainder cases are closely allied with the pariah principle. In-
deed, in a sense, Jim Crow might have been considered a bill of 
attainder against blacks-except that the disabilities placed on 
blacks were even worse than a bill of attainder in that they did 
not even purport to be based on past misconduct, but instead on 
inherent inferiority. Whether the badge of inferiority is a black 
skin, or a yellow star, or a pink triangle, the pariah principle for-
bids the government from relegating any class of citizens to the 
status of untouchables. 
We doubt that Justice Scalia or other supporters of Amend-
ment 2 would quarrel with this principle. They might well, how-
ever, question whether the principle has any application to the 
much less dramatic situation before the Court in Romer. In the 
next section we will explain why the Court correctly viewed 
Amendment 2 as a violation of the pariah principle. 
III. APPLYING THE PARIAH PRINCIPLE 
We turn then, to the question of how to determine whether a 
law violates the pariah principle. In other words, what does it 
mean to say that a particular law creates or sanctions outcasts? It 
might help to begin with an example that does not trigger emo-
tional or ideological responses. Some studies suggest that left-
handed people die earlier than right-handed people, and some 
speculate that this might be due to greater involvement in vari-
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ous kinds of accidentsJs Suppose further research shows that 
lefties indeed have automobile accidents at a significantly higher 
rate. Under the usual form of minimal scrutiny, the legislature 
would be permitted to curtail-or even to eliminate-driving 
privileges for left-banders. Draconian as that step might be, it is 
rationally related to the legitimate state interest of preventing ac-
cidents. A state would even have a rational basis for prohibiting 
left-banders from marrying each other in order to prevent the 
perpetuation of the genetic "defect." 
But the government could not require left-banders to wear a 
scarlet L: despite the likely insistence that such a law serves only 
to warn others in order to avoid accidents, it is apparent that the 
primary, if not the sole, purpose of such a law is to brand lefties 
as outcasts.79 This is what the Court meant in Romer when it 
quoted Department of Agriculture v. Moreno to the effect that "'a 
bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot con-
stitute a legitimate governmental interest."'so Notice that it is ir-
relevant that left-banders do not constitute a discrete and insular 
minority or that choice of apparel is not a fundamental right. 
Beyond the scarlet L, the analysis becomes more difficult. It 
is clearly not caste legislation for the government, knowing that 
many people hate or fear left-banders (viewing them as sinister 
or at least as gauche), to refuse to enact legislation protecting 
them from private discrimination. The government may even 
contribute to the discriminatory atmosphere in some ways, as, for 
example, if public schools force left-handed children to write 
with their right hands. (There are generations of lefties who will 
testify that this is unlikely to be a particularly successful strategy: 
all it produces is people who can't write well with either hand.) 
The government might exclude left-banders from the military be-
cause of their accident rate or to simplify training and equipment 
78. See Stanley Coren, Age Trends in Handedness: Evidence for Historical Changes 
in Social Pressure on the Writing Hand?, 91. Social Behavior and Personality 369 (1994); 
John P. Aggleton, Robert W. Kentridge, and Nicholas J. Neave, Evidence for Longevity 
Differences Between Left Handed and Right Handed Men: An Archival Study of Cricket-
ers, 47 J. Epidemiology and Community Health 206 (1993). See generally, John J. Scior-
tino. Sinistral Legal Studies, 44 Syracuse L. Rev. 1103 (1993). Although we are both right-
handed, we should note that our selection of this example should not be considered evi-
dence of animosity toward lefties. Indeed, each of us has happily produced left-handed 
progeny. 
79. This should be true even leaving aside the possibility that such legislation might 
violate the First Amendment by compelling speech. On the speech issue, see, e.g., Board 
of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); 
Miami Herald Publishing Company v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
80. 116 S. Ct. at 1628, quoting Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 
534 (1973). 
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procurement. Moreover, under the reasoning of such cases as 
Maher v. Roe,s1 the government could presumably encourage 
left-handers not to reproduce, or at least to reproduce only with 
right-handed mates. And, as noted earlier, the government could 
enact all sorts of restrictions on left-banders themselves. 
Defining the precise circumstances under which such anti-
southpaw legislation goes too far, and becomes caste legislation, 
is tricky. Indeed, identifying legislation that violates the pariah 
principle is better described as reasoning by analogy-determin-
ing how close the law is to the core case of the scarlet L-than as 
applying a particular test.sz Thus it would be difficult to construct 
a bright-line rule for distinguishing legitimate legislation from 
caste legislation. Nevertheless, keeping in mind the paradigm 
case, we can focus on some identifying factors. Caste legislation 
sends a message that it is perfectly reasonable for someone to 
avoid sitting near the pariah on a bus, or using the same drinking 
fountain, or playing on the same baseball team. As Justice 
Harlan noted, caste legislation proceeds on the ground that some 
citizens "are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be al-
lowed to sit in public coaches occupied" by other citizens.R3 It 
also encourages ostracism; as the Court noted in Strauder v. West 
Virginia, one problem with a statute forbidding blacks to sit on 
juries was that it is "a stimulant to ... prejudice."84 Another 
problem with caste legislation is that it suggests that the pariahs 
as a group are inherently unequal and have core societal rights 
only on sufferance. Finally, caste legislation tends to be directed 
at status rather than conduct and to involve hereditary or quasi-
hereditary traits. Justice Brennan condemned the Texas statute at 
issue in Plyler in part because it "imposes a lifetime hardship on 
a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling sta-
tus."Rs These are certainly core features of all of the examples 
that began this section, as well as of the scarlet L. One way to 
summarize our view of improper caste legislation would be to say 
that such legislation condemns the sinner, as well as the sin. 
The key question, of course, is whether Colorado's Amend-
ment 2 is close enough to a scarlet L to violate the equal protec-
tion clause. The thrust of Justice Scalia's dissent is to argue that it 
is not: he suggests that the law is not based on a "bare ... desire 
81. 432 U.S. 464 (1977); See also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
82. See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (Oxford U. Press, 
1996). 
83. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
84. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879). 
85. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982). 
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to harm," but is rather a run-of-the-mill "singl[ing] out for dis-
favorable treatment,"86 presumed to be constitutional unless irra-
tional. Amendment 2, according to Scalia, does not even disfavor 
homosexuals, but merely prohibits giving them special benefits; it 
is, moreover, merely the manifestation of mild, and legitimate, 
antipathy toward disfavored conduct. The appropriate analogy is 
not to the scarlet L but to Bowers v. Hardwick,R? which allows 
the state to criminalize homosexual conduct. 
The majority opinion, while not fully satisfactory, contains 
the seeds of a response based on the pariah principle. The major-
ity is rightly suspicious of the unusual nature of the restrictions 
imposed by Amendment 2: the Amendment "identifies persons 
by a single trait and then denies them protection across the 
board."ss Under what circumstances might it be rational to im-
pose such broad disabilities on the basis of a single trait? Only if 
the mere possession of that trait brands its bearer as less than a 
full citizen. As Richard Epstein-no defender of antidiscrimina-
tion laws-has explained, society's general acceptance of antidis-
crimination laws puts advocates of measures like Amendment 2 
in the position of arguing that homosexuals deserve an excep-
tionally disfavored status: 
[T]hey [advocates of Amendment 2] have to make it appear as 
though they harbor special animus against the groups that 
want to claim the protection of the antidiscrimination ordi-
nance .... [P]roponents of the amendment must give long and 
elaborate explanations as to why some groups are unworthy, 
by some public standard, of a guarantee of the same level of 
protection that is accorded to other groups .... The inability to 
rely on freedom of association means that all refusals to asso-
ciate have to be for cause, so that individuals and groups who 
wish to be left alone now have to engage in the unhappy task 
of group defamation in order to achieve that rather simple 
end. The upshot is that the entire process sanctions a level of 
antigay and antilesbian rhetoric that is better left unspoken in 
public settings.R9 
In fact, the problem is worse than Epstein realizes. Advocates of 
Amendment 2 must not only explain why homosexuals are enti-
tled to less protection than protected classes such as veterans, the 
unmarried, and the elderly, all of whom are covered by Colorado 
86. 116 S. Ct. at 1629 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
87. 478 u.s. 186 (1986). 
88. 116 S. Ct. at 1628. 
89. Richard A. Epstein, Caste and the Civil Rights Laws: From Jim Crow to Same-
Sex Marriages, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2456, 2472 (1994). 
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civil rights law. They must also explain why, unlike any other 
group in society, homosexuals should be permanently disbarred 
from seeking such protection. The only apparent explanation for 
this unique treatment is that discrimination against homosexuals 
is desirable and therefore entitled to constitutional protection.9o 
The Amendment also shares with other caste legislation the 
fact that it penalizes a status. One need not engage in homosex-
ual conduct to come within the purview of the Amendment: it 
includes "[h]omosexual, [l]esbian, or [b]isexual [o]rientation" 
and "relationships" (which could, in fact, be sexually chaste), in 
addition to "conduct" and "practices." This focus on status is not 
an accident. Homosexuals are hated not just for what they do but 
for who they are, and thus anti-gay and anti-lesbian sentiment is 
directed at status as well as conduct. As Judge Richard Posner 
has observed, the "real horror of homosexuality" today, "for 
those who feel it as horror, is the preference itself."9J It is the 
inclination toward homosexuality, not particular sex acts-which 
sometimes may be committed by someone with basically hetero-
sexual inclinations-that is the basis for condemnation: "if you 
(being male) say that you'd like to have sex with that nice-look-
ing young man but of course will not because you are law-abid-
ing, afraid of AIDS, or whatever, you will stand condemned in 
the minds of many as a disgusting faggot. Homosexual acts are 
punished in an effort, however futile, to destroy the inclina-
tion."92 This targeting of homosexuals for who they are is, as 
noted earlier, one hallmark of pariah legislation. 
To deprive a single class of the right to approach legislative 
bodies for protection against discrimination serves not only to 
demonize members of the class as unworthy of the respect of 
other citizens. It also encourages private discrimination. It cre-
ates a specific constitutional right to discriminate, implying that 
its targets deserve to be shunned. It sends a message that unlike 
everyone else, homosexuals are not entitled to the ordinary pro-
90. Press reports indicate that the supporters of Amendment 2 engaged in a con-
certed effort to identify homosexuals with otherwise deviant lifestyles and with sexual 
abuse of children. See Michael Booth, Gay-rights Amendment Fight Costly, Heated, Den-
ver Post at B4 (Oct. 29, 1992); Michael Booth, Controversial Researcher Focus of Rights 
Debate, Denver Post at 6A (Sept. 27, 1992); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Gay Rights Through 
the Looking Glass: Politics, Morality and the Trial of Colorado's Amendment 2, 21 Ford-
ham Urban L.J. 1057. 1069, 1073 (1994); Bella Stumbo. The State of Hate, 120 Esquire 73. 
78, 81, 84 (Sept. 1993). 
91. Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 232 (Harvard U. Press, 1992). 
92. !d. at 233. Like Epstein, Posner is also skeptical about discrimination laws but 
sees no basis for protecting other groups while excluding homosexuals: "Is there less, or 
less harmful, or less irrational discrimination against homosexuals than against the mem-
bers of any of these other groups? The answer is no." !d. at 323. 
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tections of our legislative process. They are, in other words, citi-
zens only on sufferance. 
Nor does it matter that Amendment 2 does not mandate pri-
vate discrimination. The Court in Romer disavowed the Colo-
rado court's reliance on such cases as Reitman v. Mulkey93 and 
Hunter v. Erickson,94 presumably because those cases involved 
restrictions on racial anti-discrimination provisions. Neverthe-
less, both cases are similar to Romer in that they involved provi-
sions making it difficult or impossible to enact anti-
discrimination laws. In Reitman, California had enacted a consti-
tutional amendment prohibiting the state legislature or any local 
lawmaking body from limiting the right to sell or lease property 
to any person, with the obvious effect of invalidating all existing 
or future laws against housing discrimination. In Hunter, an 
amendment to the Akron city charter required that housing dis-
crimination ordinances, unlike all other local ordinances, had to 
be approved in a citywide referendum. In invalidating these two 
provisions, the Court held both that encouragement of private 
racial discrimination can constitute state action susceptible to an 
equal protection challenge and that a state provision constitu-
tionalizing the right to discriminate is different from a mere re-
peal or refusal to enact anti-discrimination provisions. 
Where Romer differs from Hunter and Reitman is that the 
general type of discrimination-against homosexuals-is not it-
self prohibited by the equal protection clause as so far inter-
preted. The Court would not apply strict scrutiny to a state law 
prohibiting same-sex marriage, for example. But the pariah prin-
ciple eliminates this difference. Just as the state would be prohib-
ited from requiring homosexuals to wear a pink triangle, it is 
prohibited from deliberately encouraging private individuals to 
treat homosexuals as pariahs or from constitutionalizing the right 
to treat homosexuals as pariahs. (It is a nice question, not at issue 
in Romer itself, whether mere symbolic encouragement without 
the actual legal protection of the right to ostracize would be suffi-
cient to invalidate state legislation.) 
Notice that the pariah principle, as thus defined and applied, 
is quite narrow, allowing a great deal of legislation that might be 
considered discriminatory. By itself, it does not necessarily pre-
vent the government from restricting gays and lesbians from 
some occupations thought to involve peculiar dangers. Nor does 
it prohibit legislation that has the incidental but unintentional ef-
93. 387 U.S. 369 ( 1967). 
94. 393 U.S. 385 (1969). 
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feet of keeping one identifiable group of people toward the bot-
tom of the social and economic ladder. 
The conflict between Amendment 2 and the pariah principle 
remains unclear so long as we conceptualize it, as did the Colo-
rado Supreme Court, as a limit on the ability to lobby for new 
legislation of a specific kind. But a ban on legislation is 
equivalent to the recognition of a constitutional right: to say that 
Congress may pass no law abridging the freedom of speech is to 
make free speech a constitutional right. Similarly, to say that the 
legislature may pass no law protecting homosexuals from dis-
crimination is to make discrimination against homosexuals a pro-
tected constitutional right. By singling out discrimination against 
homosexuals for this special commendation by the state, Amend-
ment 2 renders them a pariah class. It essentially places the right 
to be free from economic or social contact with homosexuals on a 
higher plane than the right to avoid members of any other group 
in society. As the Romer Court said, such laws "raise the inevita-
ble inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity 
toward the class of persons affected. "Ys 
The pariah principle is not, however, implicated by other 
forms of discrimination against homosexuals. One example is 
the prohibition on gay marriage. To say that gay men cannot 
marry each other is not to brand them as untouchables. On the 
contrary, untouchables are only allowed to mate within their own 
group. A rule that prohibited homosexuals from marrying heter-
osexuals would be more analogous to pariah status. Similarly, 
the "don't ask, don't tell" policy for homosexuals in the military% 
is quite contrary to a rule of untouchability. By pointedly toler-
ating closeted homosexuality, the policy in effect declares that 
other soldiers have no valid complaint about association with 
homosexuals; if the military considered homosexuals to be un-
touchables, it would either not allow them to serve at all, segre-
gate them, or require them to announce their status so that 
others could avoid unwanted association.97 This is not to say that 
95. 116 S. Ct. at 1628. Even if not all of the supporters of Amendment 2 shared this 
animus, they apparently believed that this particular form of animus is uniquely deserving 
of accommodation by government. 
96. 10 u.s.c. § 654(b) (1994). 
97. See David Cole and William N. Eskridge. Jr., From Hand-Holding co Sodomy: 
First Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. 
Rev. 319, 333 (1994) ("[a] 'don't ask, don't tell' policy makes sense only if homosexual 
conduct and identity are not in themselves problematic: if they were, there would be no 
basis for directing military officers not to ask about or investigate homosexuality."). 
There is some dispute about whether the "don't ask. don't tell" policy is being imple-
mented in a way that might implicate the pariah principle. See, e.g .. The Military and 
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the ban on gay marriages and the current military policy are nec-
essarily beyond constitutional reproach, but they do not offend 
the pariah principle. 
The boundaries of the pariah principle are to some extent 
fuzzy, although Amendment 2 is well within them. The factors 
noted above can combine in various ways to produce legislation 
that looks more or less like the paradigm case of a scarlet L. In 
close cases, there are likely to be disputes. For example, while 
legislation prohibiting cigarette smoking in various places is not 
caste legislation (it condemns the sin but not the sinner), there 
might be greater question about a state constitutional amend-
ment providing that employers, landlords, and the like are af-
firmatively permitted to discriminate against those who smoke. 
Despite some misgivings, we would argue that this is not caste 
legislation: first, it focuses on continuing conduct rather than im-
mutable status, and, second, the health costs (for employers) and 
likelihood of cheating, with its attendant costs (for both employ-
ers and landlords), provide plausible rationales for the law be-
yond mere hostility toward smokers. 
Recent enactments that require convicted sex offenders to 
register with the local police present an even closer question. 
These laws also provide for public disclosure of the identity of 
these individuals, even if the conviction was prior to the enact-
ment of the disclosure law. It is this public disclosure that is 
troublesome. By subjecting a single class of persons to this treat-
ment, these laws-sometimes called "Megan's Law" after a New 
Jersey girl who was raped and killed by a previously convicted 
sex offender-signal to the public that members of the class are 
so despicable that reasonable people should do everything they 
can to avoid them. It seems very close to a scarlet L, especially 
since once a person has joined the class (purely on the basis of 
conduct, which may distinguish Romer). his status becomes per-
manent. On the other hand, a key feature of Colorado's Amend-
ment 2 is that the disability imposed was so broad that the Court 
could find no reason for it other than pure hostility. Megan's 
Law may be justified as a prophylactic measure to allow individu-
als to protect themselves or their children from individuals who 
present a particularly grave risk of harm. Nevertheless, this ra-
tionale arguably might not be sufficient to validate the law. Con-
trary to popular myth, it is not at all clear that sex offenses are 
Gays: Still Asking, 290 Harper's Magazine 18 (June 1995); Robert Lamme, Dazed in che 
Milicary, Advocate 43 (Jan. 24, 1995). 
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more likely than other offenses to be the subject of recidivism.9R 
Moreover, the group in question is generally despised by society, 
so it is not unlikely that the legislation will (not accidentally) trig-
ger additional social sanctions against members of the group. 
The courts are already struggling with the question whether 
Megan's Law is a bill of attainder (or for similar reasons, an ex 
post facto law).99 The question of whether it violates the pariah 
principle is difficult for similar reasons, and may turn on the ex-
tent to which the detailed drafting and implementation of the law 
give credence to the purported remedial purpose.wo 
Now that we have (we hope) clarified the pariah principle, it 
may be useful to compare it with its closest doctrinal cousins. 
One is the bill of attainder clause. Like the pariah principle, the 
bill of attainder clause limits the legislature's ability to impose 
disabilities on groups. The major difference is that the attainder 
cases turn on whether a disability is properly termed a ''punish-
ment," whereas the pariah principle focuses on group exclusions 
from participation in civil society, a category that overlaps with 
punishment but is nevertheless distinct. Similarly, the pariah 
principle has a focus different than that of the Cleburne and Ply-
ler line of equal protection cases. There are two significant dif-
ferences. First, the way we have articulated the principle is 
somewhat different from Cleburne's amorphous concern with 
malignant legislative intent or Plyler's somewhat forced effort to 
draw support from suspect class and fundamental rights theories. 
Second, we do not find it particularly helpful to divide the analy-
sis between a list of triggering characteristics and an ends-means 
review. Traditional equal protection doctrine conceptualizes 
levels of scrutiny as meaning that certain kinds of legislation 
need a better justification than others. We would prefer to say 
that certain kinds of legislation are impermissible, but that one 
factor in determining whether a law falls within this category is 
whether it has some plausible regulatory justification. Our ap-
proach has the advantage of not artificially dividing the inquiry-
and more importantly, of keeping firmly in mind that the ulti-
98. See Stephen J. Morse, Blame and Danger: An Essay on Preventil·e Detention, 76 
B.U. L. Rev. 113, 139, 140-141 (1996). 
99. See W.P. v. Poritz, 1996 W.L. 374036 (D.N.J. 1996); Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d 367 
(N.J., 1995); Doe v. Pataki, 919 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Artway v. Attorney General, 
876 F. Supp. 666 (D.N.J. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996); Wash-
ington v. Ward, 869 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1994). 
100. Notably, in the most thorough and thoughtful opinion upholding such legisla-
tion, the New Jersey Supreme Court was at some pains to construe the statute and the 
administrative guidelines narrowly. Doe v. Poritz, 662 A.2d at 381-87 (limiting extent of 
public notification and requiring prior judicial review). 
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mate concern is not ensuring that laws are well-designed to 
achieve their means, but preventing the legislature from treating 
citizens as outcasts. 
Despite these differences, there are obvious similarities be-
tween these various approaches. Indeed, the results in some of 
the bill of attainder cases might well have been justified under 
the pariah principle, since blocking a group from pursuing a 
broad range of occupations is a clear indicator of pariah status. 
Similarly, Plyler and Cleburne might have been argued as pariah 
cases. In the modern world, exclusion from the public schools 
might well be considered an expulsion from the right to partici-
pate in civil society, and in Plyler, that exclusion was based on 
group characteristics beyond individual control. In Cleburne, be-
ing judged unfit to live in certain neighborhoods might well have 
been considered a form of pariah treatment, particularly given 
that the exclusion was based on status (mental retardation). In 
short, as we remarked earlier, the pariah principle does have a 
strong family resemblance to some important existing doctrines. 
We regard this resemblance as a strength, not a disability. 
CONCLUSION 
The pariah principle is not likely to find broad application. 
The reason is not that it is unimportant, but that it is so funda-
mental to our understanding of equality. Given the fundamental 
place of the principle in our society's conception of equality, we 
would not expect violations to be numerous or blatant. As a re-
sult, violations are likely to be sporadic; and when the principle is 
invoked at all, the case will often be on the borderline. Thus, the 
practical legal importance of the principle is limited. But the 
Romer Court's recognition of this basic principle is nonetheless 
important because it illuminates a neglected aspect of the consti-
tutional guarantee of equality. 
Romer predictably will be castigated as a result-oriented, ad 
hoc decision, or a disingenuous sub rosa effort to adopt a higher 
standard of judicial review. In our view, on the contrary, the 
Court deserves credit for recognizing the unusual nature of the 
case before it and the fundamental principle that was at stake. 
